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Quote page 3.

B. Executive summary
This analysis has shown that the prior use of automated for-profit law enforcement devices has not increased the safety for the motoring public in the City of Gulf Breeze, Florida. This analysis has found there was no significant crash problem at this intersection, as the Florida DOT only reported a total of sixteen (16) crashes for this fifty-three month period, for an average of .30 per month. There were no fatal crashes, a total of seven (7) injury crashes, and only one of the crashes involved red light running. This crash data listed the driver running the red light as being impaired (DUI). Automated enforcement in the author’s experience will not affect an impaired or inattentive driver.  The crash volume at this intersection is so low a couple of crashes can greatly skew the data.

An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 1 of 10
A. Predication
1. Purpose of automated for-profit law enforcement devices
It is noted that proponents of automated for-profit law enforcement devices (commonly
known as red light cameras) state without exception their sole purpose is safety. Safety
therefore is best defined as not having a traffic crash due to red light running. Safety is not
defined as having an increase in injury crashes or other types of crashes regardless of those
caused by red light running.
2. Purpose of this analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to utilize Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) traffic
crash data for the City of Gulf Breeze intersection that received an automated for-profit law
enforcement device to determine the actual need and assess the accuracy of a statement made
by the Mayor in 20111. The data was received from the DOT on July 6, 2012.
a. Dual time frames
The City of Gulf Breeze, Florida was the first city in Florida to utilize automated for-profit
law enforcement1. For Gulf Breeze, this was done before such enforcement was legalized as
of July 1, 2010 via the Florida Legislature. Gulf Breeze utilized automated for-profit law
enforcement devices from March 2006 through August 2009, and began doing so again in
March 2011. According to the City of Gulf Breeze’s newsletter dated January 20111:
Red light camera enforcement is slated to begin again very shortly in Gulf Breeze.
Legislation became effective that enables red light camera enforcement programs. Gulf
Breeze was a pioneer in Florida as the first community to adopt an ordinance and issue fines
for violations of camera enforced red lights in the city starting in 2006.
The red light camera’s (sic) will be placed at the intersection at Daniel Drive and Highway 98
at our school complex. This location is traversed by over 50,000 cars per day on Highway 98.
Parents, teachers, administrators, students and staff make approximately 5,000 daily vehicle
trips into the school complex. The need to be proactive and avoid a tragedy at this sensitive
location is compelling. The motivation for this location selection above all others in the city is
to keep the student population safe, while facilitating traffic flow and enforcement.
Our previous project ended in 2009. The city had experienced a decline in crashes each year
the project was functional and has experienced an increase since the project ended. The
new equipment to restart red light camera enforcement has been received and the project is
awaiting permitting approval which is expected very shortly. Signs will be posted at the
intersection advising that the light is photo enforced, much like toll violations are posted and
the new fine will be $158. Over half of the money collected will go to the state and the
remainder will be used to pay for the project. The Gulf Breeze Police urge all motorists to
stop for red lights. It will enhance safety in the city, avoid a fine and will contribute to reducing
crashes.
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 2 of 10
According to a published edition of the Gulf Breeze News dated May 18, 20062, the city was
using a device at this same location and had to relocate it due to it being on a DOT right-ofway.
The news story states the device was placed into service late in February 2006.
The exact dates could not be determined based on news reports, so an email request was sent
to the Gulf Breeze Chief of Police on July 6, 2012 requesting the dates the devices were
placed into and removed from service. On July 9, 2012, the Chief replied that the prior
program began in March 2006 and was terminated in August 2009, and the current system
began in March 2011. Since there is insufficient data for a post-device period for the current
usage, the scope of this analysis will be for the period of March 2005 through August 2010. It
is noted the DOT crash data is unavailable for 2012 as of the date of this analysis, so the focus
will be upon the period of times as identified by the Chief of Police.
b. Legal issues
This analysis will not deal with the numerous legal issues involved with the use of automated
for-profit law enforcement.
c. Compensation and backing
The author was not paid to prepare this analysis or assisted by any other person or
organization other than peer review of the finished product for typographical errors.
3. Benchmarks
Using the aforementioned safety definitions, the benchmarks utilized to arrive at a conclusion
for the effectiveness of automated enforcement are as follows:
• Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase?
• Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase?
• Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease?
• Did crashes caused by red light running involve an impaired driver?
• Did rear end crashes increase or decrease?
• Did other crashes increase or decrease?
An overall synopsis will follow the intersection data.
4. Notes on the DOT data
a. The DOT data lists the number of people injured or killed. For the purposes of this
analysis, any injury or fatality amount is classified as one crash. If both an injury and a
fatality are shown, the crash will be classified as a fatal crash.
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 3 of 10
b. The date ranges have been broken down into as near a 12-month interval as possible
so as to make an equitable analysis. Gulf Breeze is a seasonal town with a tourist
season, so increments must be for the same beginning and ending months year-to-year
to be valid. Data date ranges:
1. Pre-device: 12 months prior to automated for-profit devices being in place
(March 1, 2005 through February 28, 2006)
2. During-device: 12-month increments as possible with automated for-profit
devices in place:
a. March 1, 2006 through February 28, 2007;
b. March 1, 2007 through February 29, 2008;
c. March 1, 2008 through February 28, 2009;
d. A 6-month period of March 1, 2009 through August 31, 2009.
3. Post-device: 12 months after device discontinuance (September 1, 2009
through August 31, 2010)
B. Executive summary
This analysis has shown that the prior use of automated for-profit law enforcement devices
has not increased the safety for the motoring public in the City of Gulf Breeze, Florida. This
analysis has found there was no significant crash problem at this intersection, as the Florida
DOT only reported a total of sixteen (16) crashes for this fifty-three month period, for an
average of .30 per month. There were no fatal crashes, a total of seven (7) injury crashes, and
only one of the crashes involved red light running. This crash data listed the driver running
the red light as being impaired (DUI). Automated enforcement in the author’s experience will
not affect an impaired or inattentive driver.
The crash volume at this intersection is so low a couple of crashes can greatly skew the data.
C. Analysis
1. History
Gulf Breeze’s automated for-profit red light camera program was in place and working as of
March 2006 and tickets were issued starting at that same time. There has only ever been one
(1) intersection that received automated for-profit law enforcement devices, US 98 and Daniel
Dr. This system was removed in August 2009, and a new system was placed into service in
March 2011.
2. Possible external factors
a. Oil spill
Gulf Breeze is located on Florida’s Gulf Coast near Pensacola, and is a tourist area. In April
20, 2010, there was a significant oil spill in the Gulf from the Deepwater Horizon that greatly
affected tourism in the area. It is noted the number of crashes after that date totaled one (1)
from April 20, 2010 through August 31, 2010. The peak had been eight (8) in 2008-2009, all
during a time of automated enforcement.
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 4 of 10
b. Gasoline prices and the economy
Gasoline prices, according to the website Florida state gas prices.com varied widely during
this time, which also included a time of economic recession. 2005 data was not available. In
June 2006, a gallon of gasoline in the Pensacola area averaged $2.77/gallon. By June of 2008,
they were nearly $4.00/gallon but by November had fallen to around $1.54/gallon. Since that
time, they have steadily risen, approaching $4.00/gallon again in April 2011. Higher gas
prices usually result in fewer miles driven. Fewer miles driven usually result in fewer crashes.
c. Political and financial considerations for implementation
The automated for-profit system was originally brought to Gulf Breeze by the Chief of Police
at the time3. On April 5, 2011, this individual in his official capacity suggested the city form a
“back office” private company to administer the program4. Approximately nine (9) months
later3, this individual retired from the police force and formed a private company along with a
family member. The former chief‘s “back office” company was hired and he was awarded a
salary of $2,000/month. In the April 5, 2011 letter, the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph read:
“In the future, there is significant revenue to be generated by this venture.”4
3. Format
Since there is only one intersection to review and there were two different time periods where
automated for-profit devices were used, the format of this analysis will be slightly different
from those involving multiple intersections that had only one time period for the devices. This
analysis will utilize the time frames as noted in Section A. 4. b. Since an insufficient amount
of time has passed after the current system was installed, no analysis will be made for it.
D. How to use this report
For the first 12-month cycle of during-automated device date ranges, pre-automated device
data will be compared. Successive 12-month increments will be utilized for comparisons after
that point, with the exception of the final during-device segment, as it is only six (6) months.
If there was an increase in the data, it will be shown in red with a percentage listed. If there
was a decrease, it will be shown in blue with a percentage listed. If there is no change, no
color-coding will be used. Red data does not favor automated for-profit law enforcement
devices, while blue data does. A graphical section follows the individual intersection analysis
for an easier view of the data.
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 5 of 10
E. Intersection with automated devices: Specific data
1. US 98 and Daniel Dr.: 16 Total Crashes
a. Pre-automated device: March 1, 2005 through February 28, 2006: 12 months
Total crashes: 3
Total injury crashes: 1
Crashes caused by red light running: 1 (Note: DUI)
Rear end crashes: 0
Other crashes: 2
________________________________________________________________________
b. During automated device use: March 1, 2006 through February 28, 2007: 12 months
Total crashes: 2
Total injury crashes: 1
Crashes caused by red light running: 0
Rear end crashes: 2
Other crashes: 0
• Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase? Decrease of 33%
• Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase? No change
• Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease? Decrease of 100%
• Did crashes caused by red light running, did they involve an impaired driver? NA
• Did rear end crashes increase or decrease? Increase of 200%
• Did other crashes increase or decrease? Decrease of 200%
________________________________________________________________________
c. During automated device use: March 1, 2007 through February 29, 2008: 12 months
Total crashes: 1
Total injury crashes: 0
Crashes caused by red light running: 0 (no change)
Rear end crashes: 1
Other crashes: 0
• Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase? Decrease of 50%
• Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase? Decrease of 100%
• Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease? No change
• Did crashes caused by red light running, did they involve an impaired driver? NA
• Did rear end crashes increase or decrease? Decrease of 50%
• Did other crashes increase or decrease? No change
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 6 of 10
________________________________________________________________________
d. During automated device use: March 1, 2008 through February 28, 2009: 12 months
Total crashes: 7
Total injury crashes: 5
Crashes caused by red light running: 0
Rear end crashes: 7
Other crashes: 0
• Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase? Increase of 700%
• Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase? Increase of 500%
• Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease? No change
• Did crashes caused by red light running, did they involve an impaired driver? NA
• Did rear end crashes increase or decrease? Increase of 700%
• Did other crashes increase or decrease? No change
________________________________________________________________________
e. During automated device use: March 1, 2009 through August 31, 2009: 6 months
Total crashes: 0
Total injury crashes: 0
Crashes caused by red light running: 0
Rear end crashes: 0
Other crashes: 0
• Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase? Insufficient data period
• Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase? Insufficient data period
• Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease? Insufficient data period
• Did crashes caused by red light running, did they involve an impaired driver? NA
• Did rear end crashes increase or decrease? Insufficient data period
• Did other crashes increase or decrease? Insufficient data period
________________________________________________________________________
f. Post-automated device: September 1, 2009 through August 31, 2010: 12 months;
comparisons to last full year of data, section d. above
Total crashes: 3
Total injury crashes: 0
Crashes caused by red light running: 0
Rear end crashes: 0
Other crashes: 3
• Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase? Decrease of 57%
• Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase? Decrease of 500%
• Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease? No change
• Did crashes caused by red light running, did they involve an impaired driver? NA
• Did rear end crashes increase or decrease? Decrease of 700%
• Did other crashes increase or decrease? Increase of 300%
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 7 of 10
Conclusion- While red light running crashes decreased in the initial 12-month period
following the start of automated enforcement, there was only one for the prior (and entire)
period, and it was due to an impaired driver. There was one (1) out of three (3) crashes caused
by red light running in 12 months to start with, for a rate of 33%, which is far higher than the
latest (2010) state average of 1.24%. Due to the crash volume being so low at this
intersection, just one crash can result in a 100% increase or decrease.
The successive data indicates that since the use of automated for-profit law enforcement at
this intersection, while all crashes initially decreased 50%; rear-end crashes increased by
200%, and injury crashes remained the same. The number of crashes stayed about the same
for the following 12-month period, but for the 2008-2009 period, there was a large upswing in
the number of crashes. All of these crashes were rear end crashes. Following the
discontinuance of automated for-profit law enforcement, there was a significant reduction in
the number of crashes as compared to the last full 12-month period.
Based on this information, automated for-profit law enforcement at this intersection can be
said to have had a no effect on red light running crashes (DUI causation) and a negative effect
on other crashes, notably rear end crashes.
E. Graphical data
1. US 98 and Daniel Dr. 16 total crashes January 2005- December 2011
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2005-
2006
2006-
2007
2007-
2008
2008-
2009
2009-
2010
All
Injury
RLR
Rear-end
Other
Automated for-profit enforcement was in use from 2006-2009
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 8 of 10
F. Overall synopsis and conclusions
In the 12 months prior to the use of automated for-profit law enforcement in the City of Gulf
Breeze, there were only 1 out of 3 total crashes caused by red light running at the intersection
that later received a device, for an average rate of 33%, which is higher than the 2010 state
average for all crashes of 1.24%. It is noted this crash involved an impaired driver- a DUI
violation. In the author’s law enforcement experience, impaired and inattentive drivers are not
affected by the presence of either law enforcement officers or automated enforcement devices.
Of significance, the amount of rear end crashes has been a factor. Prior to device use, there
were no rear end crashes at this intersection. For the time frame from of March 2006 through
August 2009 utilizing automated enforcement, of the ten (10) crashes, all were rear end
crashes.
The claims made by the Mayor of Gulf Breeze in January 20111 were as follows:
“Our previous project ended in 2009. The city had experienced a decline in crashes each
year the project was functional and has experienced an increase since the project ended.”
Based upon the author’s analysis of the crashes as referenced herein, this statement is mostly
untrue. While there was a reduction from the pre-device period of March 2005 to February
2006 in the two following 12-month periods, there was a large spike in crashes while the
device was active in the third 12-month increment. The amount dropped down significantly
after removal of the automated device in 2009, and there were no crashes reported in all of
2011, but the author’s conclusion is this is due more to external factors such as the oil spill.
In the author’s law enforcement experience, rear end crashes are caused by driver inattention,
and are non-preventable. Additionally, it is impossible to predict where or when a traffic crash
will take place. The data revealed in this report could be drastically different one way or the
other if reviewed again in another year based on just a few crashes.
The low volume of crashes combined with the nature of the majority of the crashes indicates
the lack of a need of enforcement, either human or automated. It is inconsistent with the goal
of safety and fiscal sensibility to utilize enforcement, either human or automated, where there
have been very few or not been any crashes or any preventable crashes.
It is noted crash data is readily available to the local police, who are the ones that prepare the
crash reports utilized and would therefore be the first ones to know where the crashes are
taking place, what is causing them, and then assigning staffing for enforcement in order to
reduce the crash rate.
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 9 of 10
Regardless of the law enforcement problem, the latter situation is a sound law enforcement
management technique. For example, a city may be experiencing daytime burglaries in a
certain neighborhood. The Chief of Police would be wise to direct additional patrol staffing to
that area until the problem subsided. Another example is as evidenced by Chapter 17 Section
20 of the law enforcement-accredited Florida Highway Patrol Policy Manual5. The manual
directs the Troop Commander to assess crash data quarterly, prepare an analysis, and forward
it down the chain of command in order to reduce the crash rate.
The analysis process is specified in Chapter 17 Section 20.06:
17.20.06 PROCEDURES
A. ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC CRASH DATA
1. The analysis of traffic crash data should include, but not be limited to, the following
information:
a. Locations with the greatest number of crashes listed in order from highest to lowest.
b. Listings of the specific roadways and the number of crashes which occurred on them.
c. Days of the week and times when the crashes occurred.
d. Any violations or other significant factors contributing to the crashes.
As state and other statistics show, red light running is not the epidemic that the for-profit
automated device companies and some local officials make it out to be.
The author has concluded the for-profit aspect of this enforcement has caused many elected
and other officials that have taken an oath to support and defend the Florida and United States
Constitutions to overlook their oath and misrepresent the facts regarding traffic crashes
caused by red light running.
In this instance, evidence is present to suggest one has used the system to generate a postretirement
income. While this analysis will not go into ethical violations, there is an
appearance of misconduct here due to advocating a purchase and then profiting from it after
retirement. In the former Chief’s April 5, 2011 letter requesting a “back office” organization
to administer the automated for-profit program, the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph read: “In
the future, there is significant revenue to be generated by this venture.”4 This statement is
indicative of the mindset of many local officials, who make public claims of safety regarding
automated for-profit devices when their actual concern is revenue.
The author was not paid to prepare this analysis or assisted by any other person or group other
than peer review for typographical errors.
An Analysis of the City of Gulf Breeze Automated For-
Profit Red Light Camera Program
By Paul Henry
July 9, 2012
Page 10 of 10
Footnotes-
1. City of Gulf Breeze newsletter Dated January 2011 Downloaded on July 6, 2012
2. Gulf Breeze News dated May 18, 2006 Downloaded from the Internet on July 6, 2012
3. Gulf Breeze News January 1, 2012 Downloaded on July 6, 2012
4. Minutes of City of Gulf Breeze agenda for April 13, 2011 Pages 12-15; downloaded on
July 6, 2012
5. Florida Highway Patrol Policy Manual, “Selective Enforcement 17.20” (PDF), Florida
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Florida Highway Patrol
About the author-
Paul Henry served as a Florida Deputy Sheriff and State Trooper for over 25 years. During his
employment with the Florida Highway Patrol, he investigated numerous traffic crashes and
worked as a traffic homicide investigator. He later promoted to the rank of Sergeant and
supervised traffic homicide investigators and at the same time a squad of troopers. His final
five years with the FHP prior to retirement were in the Bureau of Investigations at the rank of
Lieutenant. Paul currently works for pro-liberty political issues in the Tallahassee area, to
include driver license (REAL ID) and red light camera laws. Paul is the author of the 2012
Florida Motorist Rights Restoration Act, which would have affected how red light camera
cases are handled in court.

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